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Introduction
Many of the key issues involved in today's problems about cities focus
on local government. Government is a form of group decision making
just as is the market and can be analyzed with much the same tools.
Structural imperfections in the one can lead to inefficient resource al-
location just as in the other. Moreover, much the same criteria of
efficiency can be used in both, although evaluation of income distribu-
tion is more intrinsic to public sector activities.
In the present paper we concentrate on a welfare evaluation of local
government in the typical metropolitan area. We study chiefly the
influences on efficient local decision making of (1) population migration
into the metropolitan area from outside, (2) suburbanization of a
given metropolitan area population, and (3) the fragmentation of local
government in the metropolitan area into various nonhierarchical juris-
dictions.
Our study suggests that the pattern of local government in modern
decentralized urban areas leads to suboptimal resource use in the public
sector, and helps thereby to contribute to the severity of problems more
popularly blamed on other phenomena.
Some Issues in the Theory of Optimal Government
To discover whether a particular government is inefficient, one must
first determine what constitutes efficiency. It is beyond the scope of the
present paper to conduct a systematic study of the theory of optimal
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government. But some important issues involved in specifying optimal-
ity for the public sector must be mentioned.
Suppose we have a given population extending over a substantial
geographic area. The population establishes a system of markets for
private transactions. It wishes to establish a collective decision making
system to complement the market system. How shall the apparatus of
collective choice be fashioned? In particular, what principles shall guide
the distribution of collective powers among political jurisdictions? How
much centralization, delegation under hierarchy, and decentralization
are desirable? This differs from the comparable problem for a business
firm or for the economy as a whole because we assume that collective
decisions are to be made by majority rule. In any given choosing situa-
tion a majority will outvote a minority, thereby imposing a special
form of external diseconomy upon the latter. Different patterns of
jurisdictional delegation of power will affect who are included among
the majority and the minority on different issues, and therefore what
public sector decisions will be made, thus determining the distribution
of real well-being among the population.
Assume individualistic welfare criteria apply to the public sector.
Then movement from a Pareto-inferior to Pareto-superior position is a
sufficient condition for welfare improvement; and Pareto-optimality is a
necessary condition for over-all welfare maximization. In this context,
the presence of substantial private sector externalities suggests inef-
ficient resource allocation. Indeed, one key rationale for the public
sector is to preclude, control or internalize these externalities.
For this purpose, the delegation of power to political jurisdictions
should be done in a way that minimizes the redistributional effects of
majority rule. The goal is to shape government to be able to carry out
efficiently resource decisions which a strong consensus desires col-
lectivized. Given the convention—which could be shown to have
efficiency properties—that political jurisdictions be geographically con-
nected spaces, and that political hierarchy be represented as spatial
inclusion, the actual U.S. distribution of characteristics and activities
over space suggests that majority rule will generate the least "political
externalities"in highly homogeneous communities, and that such
homogeneity is most nearly approximated at the extreme local level
("home rule").' Maximal practical political consensus will call for very
small political jurisdictions indeed.
1Eventhe most local level will not have perfect homogeneity, but differ-
ences within the community will be substantially smaller than differences between
communities of this size.
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What size unit would most effectively achieve "home rule" con-
sensus is significant in assaying governmental performance, for con-
sensus, while important, is not the only consideration bearing on
efficiency, and the size of the jurisdictional unit affects the achievement
of the others.
Economies and diseconomies of scale is one. If public output is
produced under substantial scale economies, then a system of many
very small jurisdictional units will incur considerably higher costs of
producing public output than will a system of a few large units. Savings
under the second could adequately compensate individuals who would
have preferred the first. Other things being equal, the greater the net
scale economies the larger is the size of the optimal political jurisdiction.
Other things are not equal. While the exact magnitudes depend on
real world facts,it seems reasonable to surmise that the degree of
political decentralization which maximizes consensus generates units
considerably smaller than what is efficient for public output produc-
tion. Some moderate scale economies do very likely exist for particu-
lar public functions, and these probably more than offset scale dis-
economies in a few other functions so that, aided by constant costs in
the bulk of public services, minimum average costs are achieved in
the moderate sized jurisdiction, a scale which much exceeds the unit of
maximal consensus (probably the neighborhood)
2 Werefer to jurisdictions for clustersofpublic functions, not for single
functions. Functions will generally differ in their consensual and scale economy
characteristics. Optimal size for consensus and scale will both necessitate com-
promise among the component function profiles—but a different compromise
generally for the two, as the text asserts.
Jurisdictions could be set up for individual functions. Since consensus is more
broadly attainable for certain functions, government units for some functions
might be formed which were optimal on both home rule and scale economy
grounds. The special district represents an accommodation of this sort. But while
the existence of a few types of special district in an environment of multifunction
jurisdictions may prevent important scale economies from being neglected, a
system where all public functions are divided into single-function jurisdictions
is quite different, and can be shown to be highly inefficient. First, it would sub-
stantially increase total resource costs of public decision making, since such
decision making involves important overhead components which would be seri-
ously underutilized. Legislative, executive and judicial bodies set up to perform
one function could inexpensively perform related functions as well. Second, it
would hamper the rationality of public decision making by preventing the same
electorate from considering complementary and substitutiverelations among
different functions. Compromises (log-rolling) across different functional cate-
gories would be unavailable to accommodate intergroup differences in policy
preferences.
A further mechanism for minimizing scale economy—home rule discrepancies
is claimed to be in the ability of a given multifunction jurisdiction to purchase34 TheAnalysisof Public Output
Another efficiency consideration arises out of externalities not with-
in, but among, political jurisdictions. If the population affected by the
policy of any jurisdiction is larger than that jurisdiction's constituency
the jurisdiction will generate externalities beyond its borders. Similarly,
if the actions of nonconstituents of a jurisdiction can influence the
operation of policies within the jurisdiction, then externalities will
be imposed on the jurisdiction from outside. In both instances the
externalities are not of the usual economic sort: here the behavior of
at least one of the participants involves political action, not economic.
What is involved is that the jurisdiction is too small to enable the en-
tire affected population to take the totality of their interaction into
account in formulating public policy. Public decision making is faulty
insofar as important interactions either cannot be coordinated or must
be disregarded.
All other things being equal, the jurisdictional unit should be large
enough to include the total population affected by all policies within
its purview and all whose behavior affects the character of its policies.
Even more than scale economies, this desirability of internalizing all
sources of interjurisdictional externality prescribes a local jurisdic-
tional unit considerably larger than what is called for on home rule
grounds.
Both scale economies and diseconomies, and interjurisdictional
externalities affect the real cost and real output possibilities with
existing resources. Changes in unit size toward greater efficiency will
result in output gains available to serve as bribes (compensation) to
induce general agreement to the direction taken—i.e., they result in
Pareto improvements. A third efficiency consideration refers to income
distribution alone. Collective choice is not resorted to only to fulfill
allocative goals;itisconventionally employed to achieve income
distributional goals as well. Indeed, political scientists often devote
preeminent attention to the redistributive functions of government,
largely ignoring the allocative.
Suppose the population of the system as a whole decides that it
wishes the political apparatus to make possible a certain range of
redistributional functions. We suppose this is arrived at within the
services from public or private organizations which can more efficiently produce
those services. This is possible for some functions, but by no means all.Itis
likely to be difficult where large, durable, specialized capital installations are
associated with provision of the services; where the services are difficult to price
on a market; where sensitive direct relations with the electorate as clients are
integral; or where the chief production issue is not so much to provide inputs
cheaply as to coordinate the planning of a complex service system.
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highest governmental jurisdiction of the system, supposing this to be
anterior to the various decentralized jurisdictions. The broad prin-
ciples and direction of desirable redistribution are assumed to be
decided here; however, it is desired that they be worked out concretely
in ongoing situations close to jurisdictional levels possessing strong
consensus. This goal requires forming jurisdictional units which con-
tamboth the appropriate donors and beneficiaries and in which
majorities and minorities are present that will make the appropriate
everyday decisions likely to come to pass. Whereas maximal con-
sensus requires optimal homogeneity, "socially desired" redistribu-
tions require optimal heterogeneity. At whatever level of government
the redistributive function is desired to be incorporated, jurisdictional
units at that level must include the desired constituent mix, whether
by spatial extension or by inducements on the locational incentives
of private parties. Since the latter device depends on the everyday
incentives of existing—and sometimes inappropriate—constituencies,
the former is more dependable. Thus, insofar as there may be "socially
approved" redistributional goals, and insofar as some of them may be
delegated to the local level of government to be fulfilled, the desirable
unit is likely to be larger and more heterogeneous than what would
be designated on home rule consensus grounds alone.
In sum, we denote four types of criteria with which to evaluate the
optimality of local political jurisdictions: (1) minimization of political
externalities within each jurisdiction,(2) minimization of political
externalities across jurisdictions, (3) minimization of the resource
cost of providing public output, (4) maximization of the achievement
of social redistributive goals. Of these, the first and fourth rest upon
social value judgments about real income redistributions, the second
and third rest upon narrower definitions of efficiency in terms of ag-
gregate output levels. Broadly, (1) calls for the greatest degree of
political decentralization, (2) and (4) for the least. In general no dis-
tribution of political powers is likely to rank uniformly on all criteria.
Relative evaluation of alternative distributions will depend on trade-
offs across these criteria, whose a priori character is difficult to discern,
except in principle for the common aggregate output dimension of (2)
and (3)—although the actual empirical magnitudes of these trade-offs
are not less difficult to discern.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall examine to what extent the
distribution of political powers within a typical metropolitan area
meets the various criteria specified here. We shall be most concerned
with tensions between home rule and interjurisdictional externalities36 The Analysis of Public Output
within this institutional setting, but an examination of a potential con-
flict between home rule and the redistributive function will precede
this. Finally, the strategic opportunities for ameliorating these con-
flicts inherent in scale economies will be briefly noted.
Constituent Composition and
the Collective Redistributive Function
Assume we begin at timewith a metropolitan area in which the
"entire" urban population is concentrated in the central city:the
"suburbs" are still rural. The population N at t0, N°, has a certain total
- Yo
income Y° and a certain distribution of that income, of which Y° =— isthe
N°
mean,the standard deviation, m3 the third moment, etc.
Given these characteristics of income, in a socio-economic institu-
tional context which we shall assume to remain essentially unchanged
throughout the analysis, the collective decision making process—the
municipal government—generates a tax system from which we can
predict a real-income redistributive flow—a tax-expenditure program
providing services which help the poor: a "welfare" program3—for
each specified tax rate. This productivity of the tax system can be
expressed as a percentage of the community's income (k). Further, we
may measure each actual flow in a normalized form as the per capita
income improvement to the poor. A simple model will be presented to
indicate the relationships involved.
(1) T1 =T2)
—.=->0, —>0, or
whereis the SMSA total income at tl;Y'is the SMSA per capita
income at isthe dispersion of the income distribution at t'; T1 is
the central city tax rate for welfare purposes; T'2 is the suburban tax rate
for welfare purposes; andis the productivity of the tax system, mea-





Itis a "welfare" program in a broad sense. It includes public goods enjoyed by
the nonpoor as well as the poor.
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where is the number of poor people—beneficiaries of the welfare
program—in the central city atand Wt is the size of the welfare
budget per welfare recipient at tt.
The tax rates in 1 and 2 express only the levies for welfare purposes,
interpreted broadly. For simplification we assume that other dimensions
of the city and suburban budgets are unaffected by the population shifts
involved in the model.
Now we introduce an opportunity for greater home rule. Income
recipients above the mean are paying taxes to support welfare services
for low-income households. If they moved to a new political jurisdiction
in the suburbs where the population was homogeneously concentrated
above the poverty line the total redistributive flow necessary to raise
through government would be considerably lower—i.e., the suburban
welfare tax rate T2 would be less than T1. This attraction has to be
balanced against a comparison between suburban and city land prices,
the greater transportation costs necessitated by a suburban location,
and the general tastes for or against the amenities of suburban relative
to urban life. Symbolically, the decision to relocate in a suburban
political jurisdiction is given in the suburb location function, as follows:
(3) =II(No,A,
whereis the price per acre in the suburbs atq1 is the price per acre
in the city atA refers to relative amenities in city and suburb and is
a general index of tastes for urban vs. suburban life; and is the
number of persons locating in the suburbs at tt.
We have assumed that at t0 N2 =0.Let tastes for suburban life
T20 q2o
improve among a small group, so that at —,— theyare now willing to
T10 q1o
move to the suburbs. This establishes an initial emigration source.
There is also an immigration source. Whenever someone leaves the city
an "empty place" is created, and this place is filled by an immigrant
from outside the metropolitan area. The latter belongs to a population
which is attracted to the higher average income opportunities available
in the SMSA than in its place of origin. The immigrant population has
a lower per capita income and a higher incidence of poor people. The
mean out-migrant income is (1 + r)Y°, that of in-migrants, (1 —r)F°;
so the mean difference between them is 2rF°. The mean difference in
incidence of the poor in the two streams is w.4 Thus:
As the two streams proceed, the mean city income drops, so the differential
between them decrear :s. We assume immigrant incomes to be unchanged, a reflection
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where EY1 and are expected values of Yi and Nw and isthe
original per capita income in the city.
Since immigration into the metropolitan area is assumed to depend
on per capita income differences, similar differences between central
city and suburb must be assumed to evoke similar desires to suburbanize
by lower-income city dwellers, or to prevent the suburbanites from
escaping the city's tax jurisdiction. In the present model we assume
these desires are frustrated by the incentive and ability of the subur-
banizing well-to-do to prevent either of these from occurring. Zoning
regulations, high travel costs, and sometimes outright discrimination
hamper low-income suburbanization, and home rule sovereignty vetoes
political annexation. On the other hand, the central city cannot, or does
not, similarly "protect" itself against the flow of low-income migrants.
These assumptions are not far from real-world circumstances.
This outflow together with its inflow replacement have the effect of
decreasing the city's mean income and income dispersion, and thereby
of decreasing the productivity of the tax system, while at the same time
increasing the welfare case load (equation 5). The response to this by
the municipal government with respect to its welfare tax rate is of real
importance. We assume that the tax rate is negatively influenced by the
productivity of the tax system, positively by the tax welfare case load,
and negatively by the fear of losing high income population to the
suburbs. I.e.,




0T1/Ok < 0 because, for a given case load, a greater tax productivity
suggests the need for a smaller tax rate to furnish adequate welfare
services.
0T1/ONw > 0 because, all else being equal, a larger case load induces
the production of greater welfare revenues through tax rate increases.
of a very large pool of potential immigrants relative to the specific SMSA being
discussed. Thus, when mean city income has fallen to this level, immigration will
cease even though suburbanization continues.Local Decentralization and Optimal Government 39
8T1/8N2 < 0 because, all else being equal, an increase in T1 without
a comparable increase inwillinduce further out-migration of higher-
income households with consequent further replacement that lowers
and the productivity of the tax system, while increasing the welfare
case load. The intensity of the constraint against tax rate increases from
this source is approximated by the size of N2 (actually N° —N2)since
this indicates how much migration loss has already occurred, and there-
fore how important (scarce) the remaining upper income population in
the city is. In addition, it suggests roughly the existing extensiveness of
the T2/T1 discrepancy in terms of its effect on locational incentives. The
larger is N2 (relative to N°) the more reluctant will the city be to risk
"chasing" more of its inhabitants out by even further tax rate increases.
What then is the effect of the first migration round on the tax rate?
From (6) taking into account (1), (4), and (5), and rearranging, we may
write:
dT1 r2rY°8k8Ek 8ET] aT1 aT1
(7)—=—i —— -=+-——i+w
8k L N18Y c3Ecr8N2J 8N2
Since t3T1/ak < 0, 2r?/N1 > 0, ak/a?> 0, > 0, <
0, wöT1/8ENw > 0, and 8T1/&N2 > 0, the first two terms are positive
and the third is negative. Migration tends to increase the city tax rate
insofar as it decreases the tax's productivity while increasing the welfare
case load. It tends to decrease the tax rate insofar as it enhances the
desirability of the remaining upper-income persons and thereby leads
to efforts to forestall further out-migration. The net effect depends on
the relative size of the opposing forces.
In the situation at hand with trivial N2, the increasing forces are likely
to prevail and the tax rate will rise. The rise in T1 will now make location
in the suburbs seem more attractive to persons hitherto just willing to
stay in the city, persons whose antipathy to suburban living is slight
relative to the rest of the population, or whose positive attraction for
the suburbs is relatively strong and has been just barely offset by suburban
disadvantages like high transportation expenses. Some of these will now
therefore move to the suburbs; their places will be taken by others from
the same lower-income outside population as before. This will have the
same effect on tax productivity, welfare load and very likely, on the tax
rate again. So a third and successive round will proceed via this mecha-
nism, until greater and greater personal antipathy to suburban living
has to be overcome to induce further migration, and the growing despera-
tion in the city about the loss of higher-income groups prevents the tax
rate from rising despite unfinanced growing public service needs. More-I
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over, in-migration will be shut off when the falling per capita city income
reaches the level of the in-migrants.
It is instructive to ask what happens to the level of redistributive aid
during this migration process. The analysis is given in (8):
r8I'1 8Nw o(—-J Nw IT1— + Yi—I -
'8 \Nw/ LaN2 aN2J aN2
aN2 — (Nw)2
Since the out- and in-migration processes have a stochastic element,
we convert to expected values in the appropriate places.








The first term represents the tax loss per welfare client due to the changed
income composition of the city population; the second is the revenue
change per welfare client due to a tax rate change; the third is the result
of spreading the original welfare revenues over a larger case load [espe-
cially when written as (T1Y1/Nw)(w/Nw)]. The first and third terms are
negative; the second depends on the direction of response of the municipal
tax rate.
From this formulation we can see what constitutes a dilemma for the
city. If the city keeps its tax rate unchanged (its constraint against losing
further well-to-do population just offsetting the opposite pressures of
tax erosion and heightened expenditure needs), then its per-client welfare
benefits will decline, possibly substantially. If it attempts to forestall this
by raising its tax rate, then welfare standards will decline anyway unless
the tax increase is large enough to offset the other factors. A rate increase
raET12rT1Y°wi'1
large enough to maintain welfare standards = +—
LaN2 1'1 Nw f2rw\1
> T1 1— + —II will induce additional out-migration with its atten-
\N1Nw/J
dant replacement by a population that erodes its taxable capacity and
expands its needed welfare services: in other words, it simply buys a
small amount of time before induced suburbanization brings about the
same dilemma, but in even worse degree (because of the further popula-
tion compositional change). A tax rate decline intended to attractLocal Decentralization and Optimal Government 41
suburbanites back to the city results in a significant worsening of welfare
services.
Insofar as the present simplified model (especially with respect to the
endogeneity of the in-migration stream5) resembles the real world, the
option most likely to be chosen is to raise tax rates somewhat, to allow
welfare standards to fall somewhat, and to allow some further subur-
banization to be pushed—a compromise of sorts.
How is this phenomenon to be appraised in welfare terms? It is some-
times described as a distortion of resource allocation: basic needs
hitherto met by the public sector are now going unmet. The public
sector, because of shifts in fiscal capacity, becomes less responsive to
the needs of its own constituents. A less responsive public sector is a
distortion of the purpose of collectivization. So a straightforward welfare
loss is encountered as a result of less efficient decision making.
This argument is faulty. The critical error is in carrying out the analysis
as though a given population were experiencing an inadvertent loss of
control over their own collective instrumentality. In fact, the con-
stituency of the city government changes throughout the process. It
becomes, from the welfare point of view, a different decision-making
unit. The cut in per-client benefits, the raising of the tax rate, are well
understood in these terms: a new group with lower per capita income
than the earlier one, faced with a rising cost of welfare per capita of
population, chooses rationally to purchase a smaller bundle of such
services. The higher tax rate expresses the higher cost to the new com-
munity, the lower welfare standards express the rational output response
by the new decision makers. So long as the new city population differs
from the old we cannot conduct a straightforward welfare analysis. No
direct normative comparison can be made between the two populations
or the relative over-all fulfillment of their respective needs.
An indirect analysis can, however, be made. What has happened must
be viewed against the whole of the population affected. The critical,
indeed active, agency is the group that migrated to the suburbs to take
advantage of the tax benefits inhering in a closer approximation to
home rule with selective entry. Their move has resulted in the formation
of a community for themselves more nearly homogeneous than they
had before, and the transformation of the community they came from
into one also more nearly homogeneous than before. In the latter com-
munity, this homogenizing has raised the cost of redistributing income
5The typical real-world phenomenon is an immigrant stream largely exogenous.
It has many of the characteristics we posit here, but its largely uncontrollable magni-
tude has an active augmenting role, not merely a passive one, in the forces leading
to suburbanization.42 The Analysis of Public Output
to any desired recipient level through the collective mode of decision
making, as witnessed by the increased tax rate (or perhaps more clearly,
by the erosion of tax productivity k). That less recipient redistribution
will be purchased when its price rises is to be expected.
Thus, if the population of the over-all system has decided on a certain
desirable degree of income redistribution to be achieved at the local
level, closer approximation to home rule can induce too little a degree
of population mix in each community to bring it about. This decrease
in average redistribution might be accompanied by an increase in over-
all redistribution if—as is likely—immigrants came from areas in which
redistribution was less than the newer lower level at their destinations.
Regardless of this, however, even the average degree of redistribution
would be greaterif,despite physical suburbanization, suburbanites
remained within the samepoliticaljurisdiction. Itis not physical but
jurisdictional mobility that affects redistributional ease. The home rule
option of forming separate, more homogeneous jurisdictions through
controlled political entry conflicts with the possibility of maintaining
jurisdictions with desirable population mix for redistributional purposes.
The unrestricted right to maximize home rule consensus could transform
the local community system into a set of homogeneous special privilege
preserves established by active segregating groups on the one hand, and
a set of residual homogeneous dumping grounds, passively
formed in their wake, on the other. The use of local government for
significant redistributional purposes would be significantly compromised.
The welfare evaluation of our model is therefore based on the efficiency
of the public sector to produce not income but income redistribution.
It depends on the existence of social value judgments concerning the
desirable degree and locus of income redistribution. While such decisions
are, of course, highly controversial, the structure of the normative
analysis that results is the same in the two cases. If we agree on the
goals for public decision making we can examine the efficiency with
which the particular institutions achieve the redistributional as well as
the income level goals. Since ideal resource utilization includes estab-
lishment of decision-making instruments that can meet society's broad
goals, redistributional inefficiency is a symptom of resource misalloca-
tion just as is income level inefficiency.
Analysis of the use of resources to produce decision-making apparatus
has been largely neglected, but it represents an extremely important
type of production. Collective decision making especially merits new
attention, since it has often been accorded an ideological sanctuary
akin to that of individual decision making. This paper joins other recent
work in attempting to rectify this omission.Local Decentralization and Optimal Government 43
A final matter. We see that the goal of unrestricted home rule con-
sensus can conflict with income redistributional goals. One compromise
is to restrict the former somewhat in the interest of the latter. Another
is to shift the locus of redistributional responsibility to a higher level of
government, where adequate population mix is achieved despite local
homogeneity.Since the real-world counterpart of our model's in-
migration is heavy interregional flows, largely uncontrollable on even a
state level, this suggests that the appropriate site of such responsibility
is the federal level.
Home Rule, Suburbanization and Interjurisdictional
Externalities: A Family of Location-Resource
Allocation Models
So far we have dealt with misallocations concerning the income redis-
tributive goal. For the rest of the paper we shall be concerned with the
more usual aggregate income level goal. We find public sector trans-
actions that appear to produce resource misallocations in this more
usual sense.
The crux isthat the ability of economic agents—households and
business firms—to proliferate nonhierarchicalpolitical jurisdictions
within the metropolitan area, and their freedom to relocate among
them at will, creates a set of asymmetrical interjurisdictional exter-
nalities, especially between the central city and the several suburban
jurisdictions taken as a whole. These externalities affect the revenue and
expenditure policies of the several jurisdictions and by so doing, have
an impact on the decisions taken by the economic units as to where
they should locate within the metropolitan area. Each stage of location
decisions creates a new balance of interjurisdictional externalities in the
system and thereby influences a new stage of impacts on public sector
experience and then new location decisions. The allocation of resources
to the several units in the public sector, as reflected in the ultimate
pattern of intrametropo[itan location, can thus be explained in part by
the presence of these externalities. As such, they bear the usual stamp
of inefficiency stemming from imperfect coordination between wants
and opportunities.
Many issues are involved in formulating a complete system. The
author has been examining a family of models to incorporate the several
factors. We present here only the two simplest ones, in order to throw44 The Analysis of Public Output
into boldest relief the kind of impact interjurisdictional externalities
have on resource allocation. But it is instructive to summarize the char-
acter of other members of the family.
1. A model of residential location. The same homogeneous public
good is produced in all political jurisdictions, and the total public
output is invariant over different locational configurations. Taxes
are levied on income, but all individuals have the same income.
2. The same, but total public output varies with different locational
configurations.
3. The same as no. 1, but a separate tax on land and improvements is
levied, relative land prices explicitly influence location decisions
and are endogenous, and individual income levels differ.
4. A model of residential and business location. An invariant homo-
geneous public good, a separate tax on land and improvements.
5. The same, but with relative land prices influencing location.
6. A model of residential location. Heterogeneous public output.
Differential spillovers as interjurisdictional consumption.
7. The same for residential and business location.
8. The same as no. 6, but differential spillovers are costs of accessibility
to the SMSA center.
9. The same as no. 6, but the specialized differentiated public outputs
in different jurisdictions are endogenous (functions of locational
configurations).
We shall concentrate on models number 1 and 4.
A Model of Residential Location
with Interjurisdictional Externalities
of the Model
This first model is notably oversimplified, excluding some important
facts of both private and public sector mechanisms and somewhat
misrepresenting others. But it illustrates sharply the kind of impact that
interjurisdictional externalities have on resource allocation, and the role
that home rule distribution of political power—local political frag-
mentation—plays in generating these externalities.
Assume the SMSA contains N individuals, N1 in the central city and
N2 in the suburbs—with separate political jurisdictions.Local Decentralization and Optimal Government 45
(10) N=N1+N2
In the present model we hold total SMSA population constant in order
to isolate the effects of intrametropolitan locational distribution alone.
The over-all character of the population remains unchanged, and we
assume that every individual has the same per capita income. This
makes plausible our assumption about the homogeneity and invariance
of public sector output.
The public sector produces either a single type of output or—more
realistically—a bundle of commodities with constant proportions among
them. Only the scale of the bundle may change, not its internal composi-
tion. The population has an identical per capita effective demand for
public output, and this is invariant over different locational distribu-
tions.6 Each individual has an effective demand for public output—i.e.,
at the political deliberative, not the consumption, stage—only in the
jurisdiction where he is a legal resident, regardless of where else he may
actually consume public output. Thus:
(11)
Gis the size of the public output.
We assume that political decision making is such that whatever out-
put is demanded is exactly supplied, so that actual budgeting is demand
determined: government is "perfectly" responsive.
(12) G5 =GD
An important aspect of the whole family of models being considered
is that a distinction is made between the output of public goods and the
productive inputs necessary to produce them. This distinction is rarely
maintained elsewhere, partly because of the tradition of measuring value
of public output by the total cost of the inputs used. This has stemmed
largely from the difficulty in measuring output units and the absence
of markets within which buying and selling transactions could provide
market valuations for the several public commodities. Despite these
conceptual and practical difficulties, we do distinguish here between the
level of the ultimately wanted services and things that emerge from
public production and the variety of productive resources that go to
bring them about. We even distinguish between this "final" output and
the intermediate input complexes that are proximate productive factors.
6Thesignificance of this assumption, and a different interpretation, will be examined
more closely after the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities is introduced.I
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As an example of this distinction, in police services we assume that
individuals seek a particular level of security of property and person,
of convenient traffic flows, rather than any particular number of police-
men on the force, or numbers of detection laboratory chemicals, or
even intermediate goods like number of patrolmen beat-hours, or suspects
questioned, etc. Arrests or convictions, or crime rates, while they possess
notable deficiencies, are closer indices of the output dimension. In the
field of transportation, the citizenry seeks particular levels of con-
venience, speed, safety and accessibility—not tonnage of highway con-
struction materials used, or man-hours worked, or even intermediate
goods like numbers of rapid transit vehicles, width of streets, etc.
We now specify the resource cost functions corresponding to the
production of public output. The central city and suburban jurisdictions
have separate cost functions. We shall present two alternative functions,
depending on whether or not there exist interjurisdictional externalities.
Consider first the nonexternality case (Case I).
(13a) S2 =S2(N2)=P2N2
(l4a) S1 =S1(N1)=P1N1=P2N1,
where P is constant; S1 is the resource cost of the public sector in the
central city; S2 is the resource cost of the public sector in the suburbs;
P1 is the per capita cost (price) of the public output produced in the
central city; and P2 is the per capita cost (price) of the public output
produced in the suburbs.
We assume that public output is produced at constant per capita
cost in the suburbs, and this is equal to cost conditions in the city when
no externalities occur.7 The significant content of 13a and l4a is that
resource costs for both jurisdictions depend solely on the resident popu-
lation of each. The presence of either makes no difference to the other.
The presence of interjurisdictional externalities changes this.
(13b)S2 =S2(N2)=P2N2





where E(P2, N2) is the externality cost function.
The externalities we shall adduce are a qualification to this linearity assumption,
since they establish cost nonlinearity with respect to variables associated with average
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Externalities arise in the following way. When individuals move out
of the city into the suburbs they do not thereby sever their relations
with the central city. They are likely to continue many of their former
city activities—employment, shopping, recreational, cultural. Thus, for
a significant proportion of their time, they are still present in the city.
They use many of the same public facilities as city dwellers—streets,
police, museums, ball parks, etc. Their presence and use of city facilities
mean that the municipal government must make larger resource expen-
ditures per remaining resident in order to provide the same level of
public output (with unchanged quality—e.g., congestion—level) as
before the move: i.e., the denominator of the fraction expressing per
resident expenses declines by one for every resident who moves away,
while the numerator declines by less than the preceding per resident
expenses because of his continued partial use of city public output.
While it is true that many public services or facilities, once in existence,
offer roughly similar benefits to a variable number of possible bene-
ficiaries, the quality of those benefits does depend on the expected level
of use, especially past some minimum congestion level. A municipality,
having to plan for the expected total user population, will have to
tailor its scale of output to the expected amount of suburban presence
within the city. Thus, equation 14b shows the resource cost of public
output in the central city influenced by the size of N2 as well as N1.
The size and presence of the suburban population does make a differ-
ence. It is expressed in the externality cost function E(P2, N2) where,
broadly speaking, N2 influences the real externality cost and P2 normal-
izes this to dollar values in terms of the per capita cost of government
output.
While reverse externalities may exist, where city residents use suburban
public facilities (e.g., in connection with recreation or, increasingly,
employment), we assume here that these are distinctly smaller in magni-
tude. The externality cost function represents in reality the net externality
relationship between the two directions and can be tolerably used with
its present arguments because of the postulated strong asymmetry
between the two directions. As a result, P1 no longer equals P2 and
exceeds it for any positive N2.8
8Wemay interpret this less simply. The spatial distribution of business firms is
exogenous in the present model. It is often believed that sizable business concentra-
tions in a city decrease the residents' tax cost, since the taxes which firms pay or
their activities induce others to pay exceed the expenses they add to the public budget.
It is quite possible that so much of the SMSA business activity is located in the central
city that the tax rate on residents there is less than that for suburbanites, despite the
presence of substantial externalities. Since we shall be interested in following how
an initial relationship between P5 and P2 is changed by migration, it does not change48 The Analysis of Public Output
This raises a problem. If suburbanites consume their "normal" amount
of public output in the suburbs as well as additional amounts in the city,
is not total G larger? Or, alternatively, if they consume only the same
total public output regardless of where they reside, why do they not
decrease the amount they demand in the suburbs to offset what they a
consume in the city? Given the assumption of homogeneous government
output bundles, consumption in the city would seem to be a close sub-
Si
stitute for consumption in the suburb.
e
Our model is oversimplified on this ground, but the simplification is
convenient and the results not very sensitive to the issue. With respect
St
to the constancy of G, G is taken to be the effective demand for govern-
ment output. City residents continue to demand their same per capita
public output: suburbanites' consumption of city public goods is not
in
an effective demand by them for such goods, since they are disenfran-
chised in the city. Their consumption raises the resource cost of meeting
the city dweller's effective demand, so it is as a cost rather than as a
component of G that we treat it. F The second question is more important. Insofar as they are sub-
stitutes, suburbanites' consumption of public goods in the city should
a decrease their demand for public goods in the suburbs. This might be
a significant effect with heterogeneous public goods. Then density or
scale, or population heterogeneity requirements might lead to certain
public goods being provided only by central cities and not by suburbs,
while suburbanites continued to enjoy them by traveling to the central
city. Locational specialization of this sort could be substantial.9 In a a
homogeneous public goods world this is less important. Overhead and
peak load considerations make it difficult for suburbanites to save much r on streets, water and sanitation, police and fire, schools, and other
standard functions of local government just because some members of
the community—typically some member or members of some of the
households—conduct some of their activities out of the jurisdiction.
Something can be saved, but nOt much.
Our assumption of G invariant with spatial distribution thus has the
effect of misclassifying part of the discrepancy between ideal and actual
public cost as waste instead of as payment for productive input, thus
overstating waste. But allowance for these substitutions increases the
the analysis to suppose that the initial ratio between them isI1.5 instead of I1. (1
The initial distribution of population between N1 and N2 will of course be affected,
since this is influenced by the distribution of business and the relative real cost of
government in the two jurisdictions, But the succeeding analysis simply examines
how this initial distribution will be changed by the presence of externalities.
Consider the specialized provision of zoos, museums, major league ball parks,
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size of the discrepancy by making suburban location even more "arti-
ficially" attractive, thus understating waste. The net effect on measrue-
meat of waste is therefore uncertain. In any case, this issue does not
affect the impact of externalities on location decisions.
Our discussion bears on our assumption of constant per capita costs,
since this implies an absence of scale effects (for constant E). Yet the
effect of the model's jurisdictional externalities is to establish a popula-
tion density effect on cost (with thresholds): lower density through
suburbanization increases total costs (partly in extra transportation).
We now specify how public costs are borne through taxes. We assume
simply that tax liabilities are proportional to income. Since all individual
incomes are equal, this is tantamount to a per capita tax. By suitable
supporting assumptions relating real estate improvements to income,
we may also interpret it as a tax on such improvements. Since the tax
is associated with the individual and his income, when the individual
shifts from one jurisdiction to another his tax liability moves with him.
For a property tax interpretation we would have to assume that the
assets upon which the tax is levied must also move with him. This is an
appropriate long-run assumption for real estate improvements. What is
precluded by this is a tax on land, since land remains in one place, along
r with its tax liability, regardless of the domicile of its owner.
We omit direct reference to business taxes, even though business firms
exist and are presumably subject to taxation. The proper interpretation
of this exclusion is that we assume that firms as a whole are subject to
a a total tax liability just equal to the portion of total costs for which
they are responsible: they exactly pay their way. This means that the
resource costs (S1, S2), per capita output prices (P1, P2), and tax rates
(T1, T2) refer only to those for which services to households are respon-
sible.'° This is unsatisfactory for the interpretation of some real world
phenomena, but does little analytic harm in the absence of a treatment
of business location as endogenous.








'°Thisdoesnotrefer to any discrimination of public goods to different beneficiaries
but only to the incremental effect on the size of total resource costs of the presence
of a household population in addition to business firms. This treatment of business
taxes bears on footnote 8 above. It implies that tax rates on households are similar
in city and suburb except for externalities.I
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where T1 is the central city tax rate on individuals (i.e., net of business
influences); T2 is the suburban tax rate on individuals (i.e., net of business
influences); (1 —a)is the percentage of expenses due to suburban-
V
caused interjurisdictional externalities which is financed by suburbanites
(a marginal tax rate); and a is the percentage of these expenses which,
2
as a residual, is borne by city dwellers.
The tax rate for each jurisdiction is the sum of the per capita cost of 5
thebasic public output bundle P2 and that portion of the total externality
cost which is borne by inhabitants of that jurisdiction. We suppose
that the decision is first made by the municipal government as to how
much of the total externality cost can be placed on those on whose (
accountit was incurred (I —a),and the residual (a) must be borne by
the city population. S
The last element in the model is the residential location function,
expressing the factors which influence the decision of residents in select-
ing the jurisdiction in the metropolitan area within which they wish
to reside.
(17) N1—L(N,A,
whereL is the residential location function, showing determinants of
jurisdictional mobility; A is the distribution of community amenities
between city and suburb; and C is the city-suburb distribution of jobs
and commerce (aggregate relative accessibility).
The decision to locate in one jurisdiction or another depends on the
distribution of community amenities between jurisdictions (a composite V
index of tastes for city versus suburban way of life), the distribution of
job and shopping locations (an aggregate relative accessibility variable),
and the relative tax rates between the two jurisdictions. The presence of C
N is to normalize the size of N1 to the given total SMSA population.
The determination of N1 automatically determines N2. The relative C
priceof land in city and suburb is included indirectly, because since it
is assumed that the patterns of relative amenity and relative accessibility
have determinable effects on location, this implies, given a set of trans-
portation costs assumed to be unaffected by the changes of the present
model (and therefore omitted as an explicit functional argument), that
—a--.r
LocalDecentralization and Optimal Government 51
a land rent gradient can be inferred whose influence on location, along
with the others mentioned, is consistent with observed choices."
The Optimal Distribution of Population
Since total G is constant, but S varies, for different distributions of N
between N, and N2, we define the optimal population distribution as
that which minimizes total Thus, the goal is:
(18) mm S =S,+ S2 =P,N,+ P2N2
subject to the constraint that individuals choose their locations freely, i.e.,
We have two cases, one without externalities, the other with.
CASE I: EXTERNALITIES ABSENT. Form the Lagrangean expression
(19) Y1 =P2(N—N2)+ P2N2 + X(N —N2—L)
from l3a and 14a. Then:
aY a
(20)a. = [P,(N—N2)+ P2N, + X(N —N2—L)]=0
aN2aN2
c3Y




with no externalities T, =P2=T,,so aL/ON, =0,and therefore
x =0,i.e., the social cost of a move by any individual is zero.
From b: N —N2—L=0,or N, =L.Together this means that any
distribution along L is optimal: redistributions do not affect total costs.
CASE II: EXTERNALITIES PRESENT.
(21) =P,(N—N2)+ E(P2, N2) + P2N, + X(N —N2—L)
Setting partial derivatives equal to zero for first order conditions:
"Our exclusion of land taxes means that tax changes do not necessarily become
capitalized in land prices.
LI
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I \
EN, (OL \T11
(22a)X = i—0 generally, since 0
OL \3N2 ON2 1+—
ON2 A
Similarly, N —N2—L0, so
(22b) N1=L
Equation 22a is the crux. The right side represents the marginal
social cost of an additional unit move to the suburbs, the left side the
marginal social value. The marginal social cost comprises a direct and
an indirect component. The numerator represents the marginal exter-
nality cost of a single unit's move to the suburbs; the denominator
represents the number of units who make the move, both by direct
initiation (i.e., 1) and as induced through the influence of such moves on
T2 / OL \OL OL o(T2/T1) c3L
—(i.e., 1. = <0 (since > 0







i.e., the social value of an additional move to the suburbs must exceed
the mere marginal externality cost because the first move will induce
others (interpreting "unit" as more than one person, so that I +
may represent at least one person), each of which incurs additional
social costs.
An interpretation of marginal social value and of the equation as a
whole in individualistic terms is that each move to the suburbs must
be worth at least EN2/(l + LN,) to the individual contemplating the
move (and therefore, on the basis of individualistic value judgments,
to the society) in order to be justified. Unjustified moves add more to
social cost than to social benefits. A possible procedural rule for empiri-
cally determining the optimum distribution is for government to impose
a charge equal to EN2/(l + LN2) for the right to move to the suburbs,
and then to allow anyone to move who is willing to pay the charge.
We assume that individuals differ in their tastes in the matter of city
versus suburb, so there will be an array of maximum charges that the
members of N1 will be willing to pay for the privilege of moving (some
will be negative). The marginal mover will be the individual whose
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maximum charge just equals the official charge. Thus, X, =
+ LN,) =X,where individualj is this marginal mover.
Equilibrium Population Distribution
From here on, we consider only the situation with externalities present.
In order to examine the discrepancy between optimal and realized
population distributions we define the "neutral tax" case as one in which
the relative tax rates of the two jurisdictions—the relative price facing
each individual—just equals the marginal rate of substitution of a
location move between them. Each individual would face market signals
which gave the true marginal social cost of moving in either direction:




where N15 is the "neutral tax" distribution (subscript Isignifies "ex-
ternalities internalized"), i.e., that N1 population which comes about
by free choice under given N, A, C, and T2/T1 equal to the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between city and suburb relocation—the ratio
ofthemarginalsocialcostsofamoveineitherdirection
MSC2
(MSC2/MSC1 =dN1/dN2S constant). In the present case
MSC =
+EN2/(1 + LN2) EN,
1
=1+ .So
P2 P(l + LN2)
/ E\r
(25) N11 =L1(1+ N, A, C
\
Nowwe shall express choice of city location (equation 17) as a func-
tion of N11, as follows:
/ T2\
(26) N1 =L A, C,
—)
= N11[l—M(d,A, C)],
where d =MSC2/MSC1÷T2/T1, i.e., the ratio of the marginal rate
of substitution between location move and the relative tax rate. M(d,
A, C) is a function for which the following hold:
(1) M(1, A, C) =0;
(2)0￿M(d> l,A,C)￿ 1;
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(3) (1 —N/N11)￿ M(d < 1, A, C) ￿0;
(4) 0 ￿aM/ad 1.
Thus: (1) if externalities are completely internalized, N1 =N11;(2) if
the private cost of moving to the suburbs is less than the social cost,
N1 < Nji; (3) if the private cost of moving to the suburbs is greater
than the social cost, N11N1 ￿ N; (4) an increase in the social cost
relative to the private cost of moving to the suburbs decreases N1, but
with an upper limit on the magnitude of the effect.
Let us now bring in the tax system. Assume for simplification that
EN2 is constant over the domain of N2 (i.e., 8E2/t3N22 =0).Then EN2
=E/N2.We recall from equations 15 and 16 that T1 =P2+ aE(P2,
N2)/N1 and T2 =P2+ (I —a)E(P2,N2)/N2. If the tax system is to
internalize the externalities, then each suburbanite must be faced with
a charge that reflects the social cost which he incurs by his own use of
city public output. Administratively, this may be approximated by
imposing an appropriate charge on each and every occasion of use; or
by imposing an annual charge on estimates of year-long costs incurred,
based on certain characteristics of the individual's over-all situation. In
either case the attempt is to pair each individual with the annual marginal
cost of his being a suburbanite—i.e., a charge equal to EN2.
But the user-charges to approximate marginal costs are generally not
available, not at least for many of the public goods involved. So charges
on the suburbanites are likely to fall short of E'y, for each, and fall
short of E for all N2. We assume (1 —a)is the percentage of total
external costs which falls on the suburbanites. Then a is the residual
percentage which must be borne by the city dwellers, and the actual
amount must be expressed as an average cost, because these are not met
by user charges on city residents, since the residual depends on the
amount of use by N2, not N1. Under our assumption of constant EN2,
=E/N2,so we may rewrite equation 16 as T2 =P2+ (1 —a)EN2.
(Any 1 —a,a(0 < I —a< 1) applied respectively to suburbanites on
marginal or average cost basis, and to city dwellers on average cost
basis, will exactly meet total E.'2)
We first examine two extreme tax cases and then the general case.
EXTREME CASE1:1 —a=I.Here the suburbanite pays the full
private marginal externality cost. So no tax burden falls on the city
dweller (a0). Then:
12Thisis not true for variable EN2,amatter which affects the complexity of the
mathematics but not the basic issues examined here, exhaustion of Enotbeing one
of them.









But LW2 =0in this case, because = and:
aN2a(T2/T1) aN2
(1) aT2/aN2 =0because EN, is constant and therefore does not affect
the user charge for the rest of N2;
(2) oT1/aN1 =0because, under constant EN,, the full marginal cost
tax on all members of N2 totals exactly E, so the shift to N2 does not
change the size of the over-all residual of E (which is zero) to be financed
by N1.
Thus, d1, and so F/i =N11(where F/1isequilibrium N1). In a
perfectly responsive system of user charges such that each suburbanite
pays his full personal E1y,, all externalities are internalized, and the
distribution of population is optimal.
EXTREME CASE 2:1 —a=0.Here the suburbanite pays no part of




P(l+ LN,) P2 + E/N1
/ EN,\/E/N1\ =11+ jil+j>l \ P2 /
The inequality holds because both multiplier expressions > 1since
EN,, P2, E and N1 are positive, while —I<<0 (so that 0 < 1
+ L,v, < 1). LN, here is affected by changes in N2, since any increase
in N2 increases the tax burden on N1 by EN,. So (1) t9T2/8N2 =0(no
a(T9/T1)





The results are: (1) d > 1, (2)<N11, (3) Njisless the greater
EN,, E/N1 and are, and the smaller P2, i.e., the larger are external
costs relative to direct costs.
In this case there is a problem of the existence of equilibrium. Given
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an initial shift from the city to the suburb, this induces additional shifts
through the relative tax rate effect which, in turn, induces further shifts
via the same mechanism. Is there any convergence so that the shifting
stops before N2 =N?To answer this rigorously would require recasting
the problem into dynamic terms. The scope of the paper precludes this.
Instead we shall give an informal exposition of the issues involved.









Our model essentially assumes =constant,so equation 30
aN2
aL
requires =0.A reasonable specification for the partial rela-
a(T2/T,)
tionship between T2/T1 and L is an exponential or growth curve, char-
acterized critically for our purposes by increasing flatness at lower and
lower values of L (i.e., N1). This reflects the cost differentials that will
induce different members of the population to shift from city to suburb.
Since we assume a whole spectrum of tastes for city versus suburban
living, at low values of L only intense city lovers are left as city dwellers
and it takes larger and larger increments of the cost differential to induce
more of these individuals to move.
In the continuous form specified there will be no convergence short
of N2 =Nso long as both partial derivatives are even slightly positive.
An equilibrium is more reasonable if we recognize the discreteness of
the population. Then the relationships of equation 30 become step
functions. As N2 increases, each new household shift causes a jump in
T2/T1 (which we continue to assume is constant over the relevant range).'3
This jump induces a new jump in N2. But these induced moves become
smaller and smaller as N2 gets larger. Finally, there comes a point
where the constant jump in T2/T, induced by the previous unit jump
in N2 is no longer as large as the T2/T, jump that is necessary to induce
the next least suburb-aversive person to make the shift (the growing
cost differentials necessary to induce shifts are retained from the con-
13Morerealistically, this effect should vary over N2. But this stems from a vary-
ing EN,,
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tinuous case above). The shift process stops, and equilibrium is achieved,





where Z(or is the equilibrium size of N,.
Thus,equilibrium short of N, =Nexists only if these relative slope
relationships exist in some range of N2 short of N2 =N—andthis
depends upon the empirical characteristics of the particular situation
involved. Equilibrium is more likely to exist the wider the variety of
tastes concerning city-suburban location among the population. If it
exists,it will occur with smaller N2 the larger the percentage of N
that has intense tastes favoring city location.
Assume 0 < 1 —a<1.So both N, and N2 must share in financing









\ + Lzq2)I + (I —a)EN2
Withoutexplicitly solving we can state sufficient conditions for d> 1.
Since the first term exceeds 1, it is sufficient for d> 1 that:
(33)
aE aE a N1EN2
+ —￿P2 + (1 —a)EN2;or —>(1 —a)EN2;or
N1 N, 1-a E
Underour assumption of constant EN2, this can be interpreted as
follows. N1 is less than optimal N,1 if the percentage of the marginal
externality falling on N, (i.e., a/(1 —a))exceeds the percentage of total
E which N1 would pay if they were subject to the marginal cost taxation
imposed on N2. With EN2 constant this is a function of a/(l —a)and
N1 only: the larger is a or the smaller is N,. If N, begins very large
relative to N it takes a large relative a to oversuburbanize. If the appro-
priate LN, function is a growth curve, this is augmented by the smallness
of LN, with large N1, since the effect on T2/T, of a small shift to N, is
very small.'4
14Agrowth curveimpliesthat the absence of a critical mass of other people is a
repelling force in location decisions. When population density is especially sparse in
the suburbs, it takes a larger T,/T1 change to induce suburbanizing shifts.58 The Analysis of Public Output
Exact conditions for d> 1 bearing intuitive force are not easy to
derive from equation 32. An intermediate form of manipulation helps
some. The condition that d> 1 is:
(34)
1
P22(l + LN2) + P2(1—aXl+ LN2)EN, —P2EN2 —(aEEN2/Nl)
[P2 + (aE/N1)][P2(1 + LNJ]
We may draw some presumptive inferences. d> 1 (and therefore
oversuburbanization) is favored by: (1) high E, (2) high LN2 (in absolute
value), (3) low N1, (4) high EN2, and (5) high a.
In the typical metropolitan area EN, is probably not much above
zero. So the first term is probably not much above 1. But in some munic-
ipal tax systems a may exceed 1 —aconsiderably (especially since we
deal only with the nonbusiness portion of taxes and expenses). For
these systems, since N2EN2 =Eby our assumption of constant EN2,
so long as N2 is at all comparable in size to N1, d will considerably
exceed 1. Thus, where tax systems fail to charge suburbanites a substantial
part of their externality-generated costs, the distortion effect on alloca-
tion stemming from oversuburbanization will be noteworthy in those
metropolitan areas where the suburban population is a sizable part of
the total, the effect will be all the more the greater the influence of T2/T1
on the location decision.
The Character of Resource Misallocation
Suppose N1 < N11. In what way is this suboptimal? Three aspects of
resource misallocation are involved. First, suburbanization is carried
inadvertently too far, because private incentives reflect social interests
in a systematically distorted way. As a result, the whole pattern of con-
sumption (e.g., transportation and housing combinations), and the
pairing of individuals with jobs, differ systematically from what they
would have been in the absence of uninternalized externalities, diverge
from the best over-all accommodation of means to ends. So there are
net productivity losses for households and businesses. Their magnitude
depends on the specifics of the situation.
Second, excess suburbanization leads to excess resource costs of
conducting local government in the metropolitan area. In our simple
model the size of this excess is measured by the difference between
actual externality costs at equilibrium N2)] and the optimal
level of costs that compromises population tastes for city versus suburb
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[E(P2, N2)1. The public is willing to pay for this much enhanced resource
cost for the privilege of ic'2leadingsuburban lives.
It may be objected that E(P2, N2) —E(P2,N2) overstates the true
amount of wasted resources in the public sector because suburban
consumption of city public goods does render social gain: part of the
discrepancy is a resource payment for the production (and consumption)
of extra public goods (G actually varies over different population dis-
tributions). This is controversial. Nonetheless, the public good decision
is taken on the basis of monetary incentives that distort the true social
costs of the decision. So some government waste is involved, and the
differential E(P2, R2) —E(P2,ic'2) is at least an index—if not a direct
measure—of the extent of the distortion.
Third, distorting price effects, although so far omitted, will probably
vary. If relative prices are admitted in the demand for public goods,
excess suburbanization increases the real price of public goods for the
city, thereby leading to a decreased combination of quality-quantity in
their production. Introducing public output production as an argument
in the location function may then show substantial locational impact.
Some empirical results suggest that differences in tastes for city versus
suburban living are much more sensitive to the public output dimension
than to the public costs dimension. Thus locational resource misalloca-
tion may be more serious when the endogeneity of public goods output
is considered. Even further types of effects may be approached, since
this suggests an explicit treatment of heterogeneous public goods.
Addendum: Residential Location
with Explicit Land Prices
In the model just presented equilibrium depended on the discreteness of
certain relations ostensibly corresponding to the discreteness of the
population. This is not satisfactory, since the relevant populations are
large enough to be well approximated by continuous models. Additional
f mechanisms for equilibrating convergence are therefore desirable. An
2 attractivecandidate is the introduction of relative land prices into the
residential location function, as follows:
I
/ r2(N2) T2\
(35) N1 =L( N, A, C, ,—),
r1(N1)T1/60 The Analysis of Public Output
where r1 and r2 are the per acre price of land in the city and suburbs,
respectively. This may be enriched further by making land values and
developed acreage separately variable, as follows:
r R2(N2)/M2
(36) N1 =LI N, A, C, ,—
L R1(N1)/M1 T1
where R1 and R2 are respective total land values, and M1 and M2 respec-
tive total developed acres, in city and suburb.
These steps permit introduction of an explicit property tax system,
but we must distinguish between a tax on real estate improvements
having the same interjurisdictional mobility in the long run as economic
decision-making units, and which therefore influences location decisions;
and a tax on land having no such mobility, regardless of its owner's
residence, and so does not influence location decisions. We do this by
recasting the definition of T1 and T2 thus:
aE(P2, N2)bR1(N1)
(37) a. T1=P2+ —
N1 N1
bR2(N2)
b. T2 =P2+ (1 —a)EN2(P2,N2)
—N
where R1 and R2 are functions expressing total land values in city and
suburb respectively and b is the land tax rate. (P2 is now interpreted as
a cost per unit of taxable real property.)
These modifications help build a self-balancing distributional mech-
anism. As persons move from city tosuburb they set in motion forces
tending to augment further moves through a worsening tax rate situation
in the city, but also tending some to restrain further moves. Their greater
density in the suburbs tends to bid up land prices there, while the now-
lower density in the city tends to make land prices fall there. These
effects need not be linear over the domain of N2, and their presence
augments the increasing friction of inducing shifts through differences
in tastes, thereby making stable equilibrium positions highly likely even
in the continuous function case. Comparison of the effect of land prices
and tax rates in influencing location decisions depends on relative values
of land versus improvements (but the equilibrating power of land
prices is lessened by inclusion of land tax revenues as a subtraction
from the tax liabilities that influence location decisions).
Nonetheless inclusion of endogenous relative land prices does some-
what moderate, but not eliminate, the misallocative effects of exter-
nalities. To see the latter, suppose externalities did not exist, and popula-
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tion distribution was accomplished through equation 35. Now let
externalities appear. The new effect on T2/T1 would change that dis-
tribution, and the endogenous change in land prices would then occur
as an offset only to the extent that some locational effect had already
occurred. Moreover, the braking effect could not logically reverse all
traces of such an effect. It merely serves to moderate the net effect.
Misallocation will continue to occur, but it will be smaller.
Sketch of a Model of Residential
and Business Location
Space will not permit more than a brief look at how the location of
business firms can be made endogenous in a model of the sort we have
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(44) Business location:
C1 = N2,A, =C11[l—Q(f, A,N1, N2)]
45T —N1P2+ crC1P2 + aE(P2, N2, C2) —R1(N1,C1)
() 1—
VN(Nl+-yC1)
N2P2 + aG2P2 R2(N2, C2)
(46)T2 = +(I —a)EN2(Pl,N2, C2) —
VN(NI+ 7C2) VN(NI + 7C2)
where C, C1, and C2 are business units in total, city and suburb respec-
tively (expressed in acres of occupancy); f is the ratio of marginal so-
cial cost of business in the suburb to that in the city divided by the ratio
of the business tax rate in the suburb to that in the city; Q is a func-
tion with properties analogous to those of M in equations 26 and 43;
is the coefficient showing a combination of lower per acre gener-
ation of public good cost and higher average taxable value of real
improvements per acre than resident unit; N, N1, N2 have the usual
meaning and are expressed in per person units, each bearing constant
average taxable real improvements; VN is assessable capital value per
resident unit (person); and YVN is assessable capital value per business
unit (acre).
In this model a shift of one resident unit from citysuburb first
affects relative tax rates in the usual fashion and induces further resi-
dential shifts in the usual fashion. But it also affects business location
in two ways: first, through the same relative tax rate change and second,
because businesses are attracted to residents for the same locational
reasons (access to customers and labor supply) that attract residents to
businesses (access to jobs and retail trade)—but with larger lags, larger
thresholds and smaller impact. These induced business shifts then aug-
ment the second round resident shifts because of the new distribution of
business in the SMSA, and thus the patterns of accessibility are changed.
These in turn induce further business shifts and the interactive process
continues.
Thus, locational interactions between households and businesses
operate at every stage through both a direct (accessibility) and an
indirect (relative tax rates) route. On the one hand the over-all locational
shift for any given tax rate change will be much greater in the present
model than in the first model with business location frozen. On the other
hand, in this model EN, and are not constant because they reflect
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central city after moving to the suburbs. This dependency is based on
the mix and scale of economic activities in the suburbs. As these become
larger and larger with N, and C,, the suburbs become increasingly
independent of the central city. So each succeeding shift of resident or
business generates a smaller and smaller externality. In the limit when
suburb and city are equally self-dependent, further shifts cause no addi-
tional (asymmetric) externalities at all. Thus, the misallocative forces
are greater for small to middling suburbs in this model than in our
model of residential location, but they probably are weaker for large
suburbs. Comparison of the over-all resultant misallocation in the two
models is difficult in the abstract.'5 It rests on empirical particularities.
Epilogue: Intergovernmental Grants,
Jurisdictional Consolidations and the Relevance
of Local Government Scale Economies
Scale economies have relevance to the issues raised in these models.
Home rule behavior tends to produce jurisdictions which are too small
and homogeneous to be efficient. Two kinds of pailiatives may be sug-
gested: intergovernmental grants or consolidation. Scale economies
concern the second. Intergovernmental grants to the central city or
direct intervention from higher levels of government would mean for
the redistributive function, either direct assumption of responsibility or
transfers to permit the lower level city government to perform its con-
tinuing redistributive mission more effectively; for the externality issue,
it would mean subsidization to effect partial or total offset to the adverse
changes in relative tax rates, and thus to moderate the misallocative
effects of externalities.
Jurisdictional consolidation (e.g., metropolitan government) would
rectify the source of inefficiencies directly, but is not likely to be volun-
tarily accepted because the very incentives that led to jurisdictional
fragmentation (the self-interest of small, homogeneous groups) would
make it unattractive to the beneficiaries of that fragmentation. How-
ever, the benefits involved will be smaller if there are scale economies
which prejudice small jurisdictions. Important scale economies often
lead to creation of larger special districts. As suggested above (footnote
"The nonlinear impacts in this model make equilibria highly probable under
reasonable circumstances with continuous functions.L
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2), these result in a different and undesirable form of fragmentation.
Central city jurisdictions have bargaining wedges here that could lead
toward partial or total jurisdictional coordination. They could offer to
trade cooperative arrangements involving use of public goods they
produce under substantial scale economies, cooperative arrangements
involving functions where externalities, not scale factors, operate to
their disadvantage. Such progressively extensive arrangements could be
further enhanced if higher jurisdictions insisted on using them as
agents for their intergovernmental transfers and other forms of local
intervention.
We have argued in this paper that the efficiency of local collective
decision making should not be taken for granted. Such efficiency is a
subtly intertwined skein. We shall need more knowledge than we now
possess to recognize the various forms of inefficiency that are likely to
occur. We shall need much more knowledge—and patience and wisdom
as well—to do something when we recognize that they do occur.
ICOMMENT
by GORDON TULLOCK, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
I should like to begin by welcoming Rothenberg to the club. He is now
the third person (Mancur Olson and I are the other two) who has
been applying the particular type of reasoning he has presented today
to the problem of the optimal size of government units. This approach
is, I think, a natural outgrowth of recent work in both political science
and economics. Clearly, the market does not work perfectly. In fact,
it rather rarely works even close to perfectly. On the other hand, the
political apparatus also does not work perfectly, and we must offset
the defects of one apparatus against those of the other in order to
choose which we will use in any particular application. This means,
in general, that we should offset what are customarily called economic
externalities with what Professor Rothenberg has referred to as political
externalities. My choice of a necktie, for example, generates exter-
nalities and there is a finite chance that a citizen of Afghanistan would
see my necktie and be annoyed by it. There is, therefore, an externality
that extends all the way to Afghanistan. Clearly, however, no one
would suggest that we have a world government for this particular
activity.
On the other hand, national defense is (as we frequently hear these
days) something which oppresses certain people in our society. There
are certain people in our society who would purchase very much less
national defense if the choice were theirs. Nevertheless, in this case
we would all insist that the particular activity should be dealt with by
the government even though it involves a political externality on cer-
tain of our citizens. In each of these cases we would anticipate that
the costs would be lower with the particular mechanism we suggest.
Let me, however, turn to a technical appraisal of Professor Rothen-
berg's paper. Let me for the moment confine myself to allocational
problems. Here Professor Rothenberg lists three goals: the minimiza-
tionofpoliticalexternalities,the internalization of the economic
externalities, and capture of economies of scale. The third of these
criteria is a mistake. As a general rule, we do not have to choose our
political unit in terms of productive efficiency for any particular
activity. There is no reason why political units cannot contract out
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terms of production. In fact, we see a great deal of this in modern
times. Police departments, education, fire department, etc., are quite
frequently contracted out. In the area immediately surrounding Los
Angeles this practice has been particularly well developed and some
of the new small communities in that area have literally reduced their
own government to a city council. Everything else, including collec-
tion of taxes, is contracted out.
Once we realize that government activities can be contracted out,
we are of course free from any necessity of selecting governmental
units in terms of an efficient producing unit. What we need is a unit
in which the externalities are rather well internalized. If such a unit
is much smaller than the optimal producing unit, it will buy rather
than produce public goods. It should, of course, be kept in mind that
we will never be able completely to eliminate the externalities. Political
externalities grow steadily as the size of jurisdiction is increased and
fall to zero only when we have complete individual choice. The
economic externality, on the other hand, will always exist if we have
more than one political unit because there will always be some effect
at the border of a political unit. Thus, what we want to do is mini-
mize the sum of these two types of externalities, realizing that this will
characteristically not involve reducing either one of them to zero.
It should be noted that if we follow this simple rule for each activity,
choosing an optimal size of governmental unit by minimizing the sum
of the two types of externalities, we would end up with thousands and
thousands of governmental units with each individual being a member
and voter in each of these thousands. Clearly this in and of itself
would be inefficient, and therefore we must combine these functions
into larger units in order to simplify the decision problem of the
individual. This is not entirely a negative factor, however. It permits
logrolling, and logrolling makes it somewhat easier to obtain adjust-
ment with individual preferences. In particular, it makes it possible
for individuals with intense preferences in one field to exert a dis-
proportionate influence in that field.
Continuing to talk only about allocational matters, I should say that
in my opinion the general approach offered by Professor Rothenberg
as to the problems of the cities is not well founded empirically. I have
never been deeply impressed with the theory that the central city is
exploited by the suburbs. When an individual moves to the suburbs,
he automatically carries with him the largest single governmental
expenditure which will be made for him, i.e., the education of his chil-
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central city, he will continue paying taxes. It is by no means obvious
to me that the reduction in the expenditures which he works on the
city by moving to the suburb is less than the reduction in the taxes.
Even if he moves his place of business also to the suburbs, and only
visits the city occasionally (let us say, to go to the theater), it is by
no means obvious that he is exploiting the city. Presumably, his custom
in the theater means that there are more theaters and hence that the
tax rolls of the city are somewhat higher. How can we be certain that
his consumption of city services is more important than this increase
in the taxes?
But here we have a matter for empirical research, not exchange of
subjective opinions. It should be noted that Professor Rothenberg's
equations would operate just as well if my belief as to what is true in
the real world is true as they would if his belief is true. It is simply
that some factors which are positive in his presentation might turn
out to be negative, and the consequence would be that we could find
the central city subsidizing the suburbs.
So far, I have said nothing at all about redistribution of income.
Clearly, this is an activity of existing governments, and equally clearly
there are some externalities here. Hence government activity can be
justified. The problem that I see with Professor Rothenberg's approach,
then, is not the justification of government activity but an arbitrary
circle in his reasoning. Once we have determined the optimum amount
of redistribution, we could (at least theoretically) design a govern-
mental unit which will produce that particular amount of redistribution.
I am by no means sure that we know enough about politics at the
moment to do this, but let us for the time being grant Professor
Rothenberg's view that we can so design government units. This re-
quires, however, that we have some method of determining the appro-
priate amount of redistribution of income. Rothenberg's approach,
somewhat concealed but nevertheless it is his approach, is to take an
existing unit of government (which I think is the national state although
he refers to it as "the system as a whole") and determine by some
unspecified way what this particular political unit feels is the optimum
amount of redistribution. He then uses this particular amount of redis-
tribution to determine the amount of redistribution to be designed into
governments.
This procedure obviously iscircular.If we are trying to design
political units so that they have some optimum amount of redistribu-
tion, we cannot obtain that amount of redistribution from the design
of political units. Having said this much, however, I should go on to
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say that I do not know any other procedure for obtaining the "right"
amount of redistribution. As a result I am inclined to the view that
we should design government units without much concern for theii
redistributional characteristics. This is not because I think it would
not be desirable to design units to give optimal redistribution, but
because I can see no way of obtaining data as to the proper amount
of redistribution. I should, of course, in this connection repeat my
earlier skepticism as to whether we know how to design a government
to get a certain amount of redistribution. To elaborate slightly, my
recent research into redistribution in the United States would seem
to indicate that American citizens do not want to give very much to the
poor. If this is so, an optimal redistribution might be very small.
I should like to close by pointing out that most of my criticism of
Professor Rothenberg's paper has been concerned with details. His
general approach seems to me to be sound, and it seems to me also
that a great many of the differences which now exist between the
detailed results obtained by this approach by Olson, Rothenberg, and
myself are the result of the simple fact that it is a new technique. If
we have further discussions of this sort and further scholars become
interested in the field,I suspect that many of these problems will
fairly shortly be solved.